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ABSTRACT
In this paper we re-examine the German dominance hypothesis, as a way to assess
whether the loss of monetary autonomy in Europe associated with EMU had been significant.
We use Granger-causality tests between the interest rates of Germany and all the countries
participating at any time in the European Monetary System, with the sample period running until
December 1998. Our results would support a weak version of the hypothesis, with Germany
playing a certain “leadership” or special role in the EMS, although she would not had been
strictly the “dominant” player.
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11. Introduction
Beginning on January 1st 1999, and following the adoption of a common currency (the euro)
and the starting of the European Central Bank’s operations, 11 European countries now form a
monetary union (the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU). As it becomes obvious, EMU
means the loss of monetary independence of the participating countries, which might be seen as
a cost, at least at a first sight.
Things are not so simple, however. As it is well known, according to the so-called
“inconsistent trinity” principle a fixed exchange rate, full capital mobility, and the independence
of monetary policy, are not mutually compatible. And this situation roughly applied to the
European economies before EMU, which shared a quasi-fixed exchange rate system (the
European Monetary System, EMS), and especially following the elimination of capital controls
after the Single European Act in 1990-92. This fact led to the countries participating in the EMS
to realize that they were gradually losing the control of their monetary policies in favor of the
Bundesbank, the central bank of Germany, i. e., the country presumed to act as a leader in the
EMS. Hence, EMU could emerge as an economic response to that situation, on allowing those
countries to regain some control over monetary policy thanks to the creation of an European
Central Bank replacing the Bundesbank, in which they could have a vote (Wyplosz, 1997).
In fact, a general consensus had emerged in Europe which would justify the previous
argument, i. e., that the EMS had worked in an asymmetric way, with Germany assuming the
leading role and the remaining countries passively adjusting to German monetary policy actions.
In its turn, these countries would have benefited from behaving in such a way, since they would
have taken advantage of the firmly established anti-inflation credibility of the Bundesbank [see,
e. g., Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) or Mélitz (1988)]. This discussion ultimately lies in the so-
called n-1 problem faced by fixed exchange rate systems, since there are only n-1 exchange rates
among the n countries participating in an exchange rate agreement. Therefore, in such a
situation, either one country becomes the leader and sets monetary policy independently (with
the other countries following it), or all countries are allowed to decide jointly over the
implementation of monetary policy (De Grauwe, 1997).
2The first empirical studies on the subject seemed to confirm the hypothesis of German
dominance into the EMS [see, e. g., Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987,1989) or Karfakis and
Moschos (1990)]. However, these conclusions were not confirmed in further research, most of it
consisting of tests for Granger-causality between German and other countries’ interest rates at a
monthly or quarterly frequency [see, among others, Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), von Hagen and
Fratianni (1990), Koedijk and Kool (1992), Katsimbris and Miller (1993), or Hassapis, Pittis and
Prodromidis (1999)]. In this way, a milder support for the hypothesis was found in the above
quoted papers; namely, that the other countries’ interest rates depended on the German ones, but
also conversely, even though in a lower extent in terms of both size and persistence. Finally,
results along these lines were also reported in some studies using high frequency (i. e., daily)
data on interest rates [see Gardner and Perraudin (1993), Henry and Weidmann (1995) and Bajo,
Sosvilla and Fernández (1997)], so that it might seem that Germany would have played a special
role in the EMS, although calling it “dominance” would be too strong.
In this paper we re-examine the German dominance hypothesis, as a way to assess
whether the loss of monetary autonomy in Europe associated with EMU had been significant
(which, in its turn, could be taken as an argument in favor of EMU itself). The empirical
methodology makes use of Granger-causality tests between the monthly interest rates of
Germany and all the countries participating at any time in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM)
of the EMS, with the sample period running until December 1998. This paper contributes to the
existing literature in the following respects:
a) The sample period covers until just the eve of EMU, i. e., December 1998. This
allows us to include the most recent events in European monetary history, such as the
German reunification, the monetary turmoil at the end of 1992, the broadening of the
EMS fluctuation bands in August 1993, and the rather quiet period leading to the
birth of EMU. Regarding previous studies on the subject, those with a more recent
sample period are Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis (1999), who use quarterly data
until the end of 1994, and Bajo, Sosvilla and Fernández (1997), who use daily data
until February 1997.
3b) The analysis is extended to all the countries participating at any time in the ERM of
the EMS. So, unlike previous studies (with the only exception of Bajo, Sosvilla and
Fernández (1997)), that consider only the founding members of the EMS (i. e.,
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland), our
analysis also includes those countries which later joined the ERM of the EMS (i. e.,
Spain, the UK, Portugal, and Austria).
c) Granger-causality in a cointegration setting is properly tested. That is, an error-
correction mechanism (ECM) is included into every equation to be estimated when
cointegration is found, which allows us to distinguish between short-run and long-
run Granger-causality1. Also, and following Katsimbris and Miller’s (1993)
suggestion, Granger-causality relationships between German and the other countries’
interest rates have been investigated both in a bivariate and a trivariate setting, in
order to avoid possible spurious results due to the omission of some relevant
variable. As usual, the US interest rates is the additional variable added to the
analysis.
d) Finally, and given the importance of the choice of lag lengths in Granger-causality
tests, these have been selected by means of an appropriate method. In particular, we
have used Hsiao’s (1981) sequential approach, specifically designed to avoid
imposing often false or spurious restrictions on the model. Notice that, unlike the
VAR approach performed in other studies [as in, e. g., Hassapis, Pittis and
Prodromidis (1999)], our procedure implies that, for any pair of variables tested for
Granger-causality between them, the number of lags of the right-hand side variables
is not constrained to be the same.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The econometric methodology of the paper
is discussed in Section 2, and the empirical results are shown in Section 3. The main conclusions
are presented in Section 4.
                                                
1
 Katsimbris and Miller (1993) were the first to notice this point, usually overlooked in the available
empirical studies on this subject.
42. Econometric methodology
As stated before, the econometric methodology used in this paper is based on Granger-causality
tests (Granger, 1969). As it is well known, the results from these tests are highly sensitive to the
order of lags in the autoregressive process. An inadequate choice of the lag length would lead to
inconsistent model estimates, so that the inferences drawn from them would be likely to be
misleading. In this paper, we will identify the order of lags for each variable by means of
Hsiao’s (1981) sequential approach, which is based on Granger’s concept of causality and
Akaike’s final prediction error criterion.
Suppose two stationary variables, Xt and Yt, on which we would like to test for Granger-
causality. Consider the models:
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and then the following steps are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure:
(i) Take Xt to be a univariate autoregressive process as in (1), and compute its final
prediction error criterion (FPE hereafter) with the order of lags i varying from 1
to M. Choose the lag that yields the smallest FPE, say m, and denote the
corresponding FPE as FPEX(m,0).
(ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m lags, add lags of Yt to (1) as in (2), and
compute the FPEs with the order of lags j varying from 1 to N. Choose the lag
that yields the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the corresponding FPE as
FPEX(m,n).
(iii) Compare FPEX(m,0) with FPEX(m,n). If FPEX(m,0)>FPEX(m,n), then Yt is said to
Granger-cause Xt, whereas if FPEX(m,0)<FPEX(m,n), then Xt would not be
Granger-caused by Yt.
Finally, by repeating steps (i) to (iii) with Yt as the dependent variable, whether or not Xt
Granger-causes Yt can be established.
5Recall that before it was assumed that Xt and Yt were stationary variables. However, if
they are integrated of order one (i. e., first-difference stationary) and are cointegrated, equations
(1) and (2) need to be amended to:
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where zt is the ECM (Engle and Granger, 1987). Notice that if Xt and Yt are I(1) but are not
cointegrated, the coefficient δ in equations (3) and (4) is assumed to be equal to zero.
Now, the previous definitions of Granger-causality for stationary variables can be
applied to the case of I(1) variables from equations (3) and (4). In particular, if
FPE∆X(m,0)>FPE∆X(m,n), Yt is said to Granger-cause Xt in the short run; and if δ is significantly
different from zero, Yt is said to Granger-cause Xt in the long run. Conversely, if
FPE∆X(m,0)<FPE∆X(m,n), Xt would not be Granger-caused by Yt in the short run; and if δ is not
significantly different from zero, Xt would not be Granger-caused by Yt in the long run. As
before, by repeating the procedure with ∆Yt as the dependent variable, the hypothesis of short-
run and long-run Granger-causality from Xt to Yt could be tested.
To conclude, notice that the above procedure corresponds to the bivariate case. Testing
for Granger-causality in the trivariate case requires amending the previous equations to:
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where Wt denotes the third variable, for the case in which Xt, Yt, and Wt are stationary; and, for
the case in which the three variables are I(1) and cointegrated:
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6so that the relevant comparison is now between FPEX(m,0,p) and FPEX(m,n,p), and between
FPE∆X(m,0,p) and FPE∆X(m,n,p), respectively; where (m,0,p) and (m,n,p) are the combinations of
lags leading to the smallest FPE in each case.
73. Empirical results
The data used in this paper are the three-month interbank onshore interest rates, at a monthly
frequency, of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, the
UK, Portugal, Austria, and the US. The previous list includes all the European countries
participating at any time in the ERM of the EMS, and coincides with that of the countries
joining EMU from the outset, which the exceptions of Denmark and the UK, and the inclusion
of Luxembourg and Finland2. The beginning of the sample period is March 1979 (i. e., when the
ERM started to operate) for the founding members of the EMS (France, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland), and the month of accession to the ERM for the newcomers:
June 1989 for Spain, October 1990 for the UK, April 1992 for Portugal, and January 1995 for
Austria, with the data for Germany and the US adjusting accordingly in each case. The end of
the sample is in all cases December 1998 (i. e., the last month before the starting of EMU), and
all the data come from the Statistic Bulletin of the Bank of Spain.
As a first step of the analysis, we tested for the order of integration of the variables by
means of the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. According to the results from both tests,
shown in Table 1, the null hypothesis of a unit root was not rejected in all cases, at the same time
that the null of a second unit root was always rejected.
Next, we tested for cointegration between the German interest rate and the interest rates
of the other European countries in our sample, both in a bivariate and trivariate setting, in the
latter case including the US interest rate as an additional variable. Two tests were performed: the
(cointegrating regression) augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Ouliaris tests. Both tests were
computed using the residuals from the (bivariate or trivariate) cointegrating regressions
estimated by the method proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990), robust to the presence of
serial correlation and endogeneity bias.
The results of the cointegration tests appear in Table 2. As can be seen, the only interest
rates appearing to be cointegrated with the German ones in the bivariate case would be those of
                                                
2
 Notice that Luxembourg, a founding member of the EMS, is not included in the sample since she
already formed a monetary union with Belgium before EMU. Also, Finland, which participated in
the ERM of the EMS since October 1996, is not included given the small number of observations
available.
8Austria and the Netherlands; whereas, in the trivariate case (i. e., when the US interest rates are
included into the cointegration equation), cointegration is also found in the cases of Belgium,
Denmark and Ireland. These results should not be too surprising since, as noticed by Caporale
and Pittis (1995), the integration of the financial markets of the EMS countries would had been a
gradual process, leading to a slow convergence process of interest rates towards the German
levels. Hence, cointegration should be expected only when full convergence had been achieved3.
Now, we are able to perform Granger-causality tests in a cointegration framework, and
the results for the bivariate case are shown in Table 3. German interest rates appear to Granger-
cause all the other EMS interest rates, the opposite being also true in all cases but those of
Austria, Ireland, and the UK; bilateral causality is also found between German and US interest
rates. Notice, however, that, when bilateral Granger-causality is found, the decrease in FPEs is
greater when German interest rates are added to the equations explaining the other interest rates
than in the opposite case (the exception being the US case). On the other hand, bilateral long-run
causality would appear in the case of the Netherlands, whereas German interest rates would
cause those of Austria in the long run, but not the other way round. These results would suggest
that, although there would have been some degree of symmetry in the EMS, the influence of
Germany on the other EMS countries would have been greater than the other way round.
Next, we turn to the trivariate case in Table 4. Beginning with causality between German
interest rates and those of the other EMS countries, the results, shown in part A) of Table 4 are
quite similar to those in Table 3. The only exception would be the bilateral Granger-causality
now found for Austria; also, Danish interest rates do not appear to Granger-cause the German
ones, even though the difference between FPEs in this case would be very small. Again, the
German interest rates add more explanatory power to the equations explaining the other interest
rates than in the opposite case. Regarding long-run Granger-causality, it would arise in a
bilateral way for Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands; also, German interest rates would
Granger-cause those of Austria, and, more surprisingly, Irish interest rates would Granger-cause
those of Germany, although only at a 10 per cent significance level.
                                                
3 Some evidence along these lines for the Spanish case can be found in Camarero, Esteve and
Tamarit (1997).
9We have also tested for Granger-causality between the US interest rates and those of the
EMS countries other than Germany, as well as between German and US interest rates, with the
results appearing in parts B) and C) of Table 4, respectively. As can be seen, the US interest
rates would Granger-cause those of Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal, in the short run;
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland, in the long run; and Austria and Belgium, both in the
short run and the long run. In its turn, the interest rates of Belgium, Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK would Granger-cause the US interest rates in
the short run. On the other hand, bilateral short-run Granger-causality is found between German
and US interest rates in most cases (the exceptions being when the interest rates of Spain,
Portugal, and the UK are included in the regressions), but no clear long-run Granger-causality is
detected (other than that found from the US to Germany when the interest rates of Denmark are
used).
Finally, we have also tested for structural change in all the estimated equations shown in
tables 3 and 4, by means of the Chow test. The dates chosen are: November 1990 (the German
reunification), September 1992 (the beginning of the turbulent period affecting the EMS), and
August 1993 (the broadening of the fluctuation bands in the EMS), and the tests are only
performed for the interest rates of the EMS founding members, given the reduced number of
observations available for the newcomers. As can be seen in Table 5, the null hypothesis of no
structural change is not rejected almost generally. The more relevant exception would be the
French case, where a structural change in Granger-causality from Germany would be detected
following the German reunification and the monetary turmoil at the end of 1992, both in the
bivariate and trivariate models.
To summarize, bilateral Granger-causality has been found between the interest rates of
Germany and the other countries participating at any time in the ERM of the EMS, the main
exceptions being Ireland and the UK4. However, when bilateral Granger-causality is found, the
increase in explanatory power is greater when German interest rates are added to the equations
explaining the other interest rates than the other way round. Therefore, our results would point to
a certain “leadership” or special role of Germany within the EMS, although we could not talk of
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 In fact, Artis and Zhang (1997) found that Ireland and the UK would have followed in recent
years a different cyclical evolution as compared to the other European countries.
10
“dominance” in a strict sense. In particular, and according to the terminology introduced by
Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis (1999), we could establish the following typology:
a) Strong German dominance: the UK.
b) Weak German dominance of type 1: Spain and Portugal.
c) Weak German dominance of type 2: Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy.
d) Semi strong German dominance: Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
11
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have re-examined the German dominance hypothesis, extending previous
findings by other authors to all the countries participating at any time in the ERM of the EMS,
with the sample period covering until just the eve of EMU, i. e., December 1998. The empirical
methodology makes use of Granger-causality tests between the interest rates of Germany and
the other EMS countries, in a proper cointegration framework where the lag lengths of the
variables have been chosen by means of Hsiao’s sequential approach in order to avoid
misleading inferences arising from inconsistent model estimates. The tests have been performed
in both a bivariate and a trivariate setting, in this case including the US interest rate as the
additional variable.
Summarizing, our results point to a mutual but asymmetrical relationship between
Germany and the other countries participating at any time in the ERM of the EMS, since
bilateral Granger-causality was found between the interest rates of Germany and those of the
other countries (with the exceptions of Ireland and the UK), although the German interest rates
added more to the explanation of the other interest rates than in the opposite case. Also, we did
not find evidence of significant structural changes in the estimated relationships following the
German reunification, the monetary turmoil at the end of 1992, and the broadening of the
fluctuation bands in the EMS.
Therefore, our results would support a weak version of the hypothesis of German
dominance during the working of the EMS, since there would have prevailed a mutual
relationship among the monetary policies of all the countries involved (with the exceptions of
Ireland and the UK), even though that relationship would have been stronger from Germany to
the other countries than in the opposite way. Then, Germany would have played a certain
“leadership” or special role in the EMS, although she would not had been strictly the
“dominant” player.
Regarding the policy implications of the paper, these would provide some mild support
to the hypothesis about EMU as an economic response to the loss of monetary autonomy in
Europe in favor of Germany, especially after the achievement of full capital mobility in the first
nineties (Wyplosz, 1997). Also, the position of the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, and
12
Portugal) faced to EMU does not seem to be quite different to that of the “core” European
countries, at least in terms of the autonomy of their monetary policies. The same can be said for
Denmark and the UK, two countries currently not in EMU; in fact, according to our results, the
UK would have been (together with Ireland) the country the most “dominated” by German
monetary policy actions.
13
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TABLE 1
UNIT ROOT TESTS
A) DICKEY-FULLER TEST
Country
Levels First
differences
ττ τµ τ ττ τµ τ
Germany -2.41 -1.96 -1.07 -4.75a -4.77a -4.77a
Austria -2.03 -2.61c -1.78c -5.29a -4.98a -4.75a
Belgium -2.31 -0.93 -0.80 -9.68a -9.61a -9.61a
Denmark -2.94 -1.37 -1.34 -8.79a -8.80a -8.77a
Spain -3.16c -0.56 -1.56 -4.26a -4.24a -3.88a
France -2.19 -1.29 -0.77 -11.41a -7.38a -7.38a
Netherlands -2.44 -1.77 -1.17 -5.65a -5.67a -5.64a
Ireland -2.38 -1.66 -1.21 -8.06a -8.07a -8.01a
Italy -2.88 -0.43 -0.82 -12.27a -12.11a -12.10a
Portugal -2.05 -1.22 -2.51b -7.71a -7.74a -7.41a
UK -2.74 -3.13b -2.14b -4.26a -3.76a -3.46a
US -1.78 -1.78 -1.11 -11.54a -11.57a -11.58a
Notes:
(i) ττ, τµ, and τ are the Dickey-Fuller statistics with drift and trend, with drift, and without drift, respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are
taken from MacKinnon (1991).
B) PHILLIPS-PERRON TEST
Country
Levels First
differences
Z(t
˜ α 
) Z(tα * ) Z(t ˆ α ) Z(t ˜ α ) Z(tα * ) Z(t ˆ α )
Germany -2.07 -1.26 -0.59 -11.29a -11.23a -11.23a
Austria -2.00 -2.74 -1.86 -5.02a -4.80a -4.57a
Belgium -3.52c -1.09 -0.81 -12.78a -12.72a -12.71a
Denmark -2.68 -1.05 -1.19 -10.52a -10.51a -10.48a
Spain -2.47 -0.05 -2.15b -8.87a -8.86a -8.32a
France -3.59b -1.03 -0.73 -11.39a -11.29a -11.28a
Netherlands -2.09 -1.29 -0.95 -12.88a -12.86a -12.85a
Ireland -3.13 -1.61 -1.21 -12.40a -12.39a -12.36a
Italy -3.19 -0.39 -0.82 -12.39a -12.22a -12.19a
Portugal -3.12 -1.07 -2.61a -7.71a -7.69a -7.28a
UK -2.18 -3.24b -2.75a -5.47a -5.27a -5.05a
US -3.23 -1.85 -1.12 -10.86a -10.86a -10.85a
Notes:
(i) Z(t
˜ α 
), Z(t
α *
), and Z(t
ˆ α ) are the Phillips-Perron statistics with drift and trend, with drift, and without drift,
respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are
taken from MacKinnon (1991).
TABLE 2
COINTEGRATION TESTS
A) DICKEY-FULLER TEST
Country Bivariate Trivariate
Austria -3.71a -3.64a
Belgium -1.90 -3.00b
Denmark -2.41 -3.99a
Spain -1.71 -1.77
France -1.74 -2.16
Netherlands -3.45b -3.76a
Ireland -2.35 -3.74a
Italy -1.02 -2.35
Portugal -1.40 -1.76
UK -1.95 -1.85
Notes:
(i) The test refers to the cointegrating-regression augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics on the Phillips-Hansen
residuals.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are
taken from MacKinnon (1991).
B) PHILLIPS-OULIARIS TEST
Country Bivariate Trivariate
Austria -3.78b -3.73b
Belgium -2.03 -3.59c
Denmark -2.52 -3.73b
Spain -1.85 -1.55
France -1.86 -2.81
Netherlands -4.01a -4.01b
Ireland -2.70 -3.63c
Italy -1.25 -2.54
Portugal -1.65 -1.92
UK -2.46 -2.14
Notes:
(i) The test refers to the cointegrating-regression Z(t
ˆ α ) statistic on the Phillips-Hansen residuals.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values are
taken from Phillips and Ouliaris (1990).
TABLE 3
GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS: BIVARIATE MODELS
Country FPE
(m,0)
FPE
(m,n)
ECM Causality
X→G
FPE
(m,0)
FPE
(m,n)
ECM Causality
G→X
Austria 0.0149
m=1
0.0155
n=1
-0.1537
(-0.7379)
NO 0.0152
m=1
0.0144
n=5
-0.6003a
(-2.6320)
YES
Belgium 0.0989
m=12
0.0958
n=12
--- YES 0.3492
m=5
0.3122
n=5
--- YES
Denmark 0.0989
m=12
0.0976
n=8
--- YES 0.3578
m=4
0.3384
n=5
--- YES
Spain 0.0307
m=4
0.0298
n=2
--- YES 0.1341
m=4
0.1176
n=7
--- YES
France 0.0989
m=12
0.0938
n=10
--- YES 0.2609
m=6
0.2037
n=6
--- YES
Netherlands 0.0985
m=12
0.0974
n=10
-0.0771b
(-2.3080)
YES 0.0969
m=12
0.0899
n=5
-0.0686b
(-1.9849)
YES
Ireland 0.0989
m=12
0.0996
n=1
--- NO 0.6269
m=6
0.6152
n=1
--- YES
Italy 0.0989
m=12
0.0986
n=10
--- YES 0.3091
m=11
0.2996
n=4
--- YES
Portugal 0.0300
m=1
0.0292
n=2
--- YES 0.4266
m=5
0.4028
n=4
--- YES
UK 0.0294
m=4
0.0299
n=1
--- NO 0.0632
m=4
0.0540
n=5
--- YES
US 0.0989
m=12
0.0885
n=10
-- YES 0.4866
m=12
0.4810
n=5
--- YES
Notes:
(i) m and n denote the lags for the dependent variable and the additional regressor, respectively, leading to the
smallest FPE in each case; the maximum number of lags tried has been 12. X and G denote every country
in the first column of the table, and Germany, respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of the
ECMs (in parentheses).
TABLE 4
GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS: TRIVARIATE MODELS
A) Causality between German and EMS interest rates
Country FPE
(m,p)
FPE
(m,n,p)
ECM Causality
X→G
FPE
(m,p)
FPE
(m,n,p)
ECM Causality
G→X
Austria 0.0142
m=1
p=9
0.0140
n=5
0.2869
(0.8850)
YES 0.0126
m=1
p=1
0.0120
n=5
-1.0391a
(-3.9299)
YES
Belgium 0.0886
m=12
p=12
0.0860
n=12
-0.0306b
(-2.0038)
YES 0.3028
m=10
p=11
0.2728
n=4
-0.0716a
(-2.6084)
YES
Denmark 0.0878
m=12
p=12
0.0879
n=8
-0.0355b
(2.5414)
NO 0.3261
m=4
p=1
0.2326
n=5
-0.0584a
(-3.3077)
YES
Spain 0.0311
m=4
p=1
0.0300
n=2
--- YES 0.1334
m=4
p=1
0.1158
n=7
--- YES
France 0.0885
m=12
p=10
0.0811
n=10
--- YES 0.2472
m=6
p=12
0.2107
n=6
--- YES
Netherlands 0.0889
m=12
p=10
0.0872
n=8
-0.0602c
(-1.8794)
YES 0.0917
m=12
p=7
0.0898
n=5
-0.0741b
(-2.0086)
YES
Ireland 0.0879
m=12
p=12
0.0885
n=1
-0.0200c
(-1.8355)
NO 0.5905
m=6
p=1
0.5904
n=1
-0.0774a
(-3.6342)
YES
Italy 0.0885
m=12
p=10
0.0883
n=9
--- YES 0.3114
m=12
p=1
0.2985
n=4
--- YES
Portugal 0.0308
m=1
p=1
0.0300
n=2
--- YES 0.3938
m=5
p=7
0.3448
n=12
--- YES
UK 0.0298
m=4
p=1
0.0303
n=1
--- NO 0.0615
m=4
p=1
0.0593
n=2
--- YES
Notes:
(i) m, n and p denote the lags for the dependent variable, the additional regressor, and the US interest rate,
respectively, leading to the smallest FPE in each case; the maximum number of lags tried has been 12. X
and G denote every country in the first column of the table, and Germany, respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of the
ECMs (in parentheses).
TABLE 4 (continued)
B) Causality between US and EMS interest rates
Country FPE
(m,p)
FPE
(m,n,p)
ECM Causality
X→US
FPE
(m,p)
FPE
(m,n,p)
ECM Causality
US→X
Austria 0.0088
m=2
p=1
0.0089
n=1
0.2359
(1.3164)
NO 0.0117
m=1
p=5
0.0110
n=7
-1.3027a
(-4.4229)
YES
Belgium 0.4853
m=12
p=5
0.4080
n=10
-0.0024
(-0.1018)
YES 0.2924
m=10
p=5
0.2722
n=11
-0.0707 b
(-2.5594)
YES
Denmark 0.4830
m=12
p=5
0.4699
n=3
-0.0404
(-1.5850)
YES 0.3244
m=4
p=5
0.3269
n=1
-0.0584a
(-3.3077)
NO
Spain 0.0293
m=1
p=1
0.0297
n=1
--- NO 0.1176
m=4
p=7
0.1126
n=3
--- YES
France 0.4810
m=12
p=5
0.4725
n=4
--- YES 0.2037
m=6
p=6
0.2028
n=1
--- YES
Netherlands 0.4834
m=12
p=5
0.3337
n=10
-0.0135
(-1.0108)
YES 0.0203
m=12
p=5
0.0892
n=6
-0.0759b
(-2.0678)
NO
Ireland 0.4851
m=12
p=5
0.4531
n=11
-0.0038
(-0.1763)
YES 0.5872
m=6
p=1
0.5898
n=5
-0.0865a
(-3.8541)
NO
Italy 0.4810
m=12
p=5
0.4707
n=1
--- YES 0.2996
m=11
p=4
0.2985
n=1
--- YES
Portugal 0.0250
m=10
p=7
0.0240
n=6
--- YES 0.4028
m=5
p=4
0.3611
n=7
--- YES
UK 0.0311
m=1
p=1
0.0282
n=2
--- YES 0.0540
m=4
p=5
0.0596
n=9
--- NO
Notes:
(i) m, n and p denote the lags for the dependent variable, the additional regressor, and the German interest rate,
respectively, leading to the smallest FPE in each case; the maximum number of lags tried has been 12. X
and US denote every country in the first column of the table, and the US, respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of the
ECMs (in parentheses).
TABLE 4 (continued)
C) Causality between US and German interest rates
Country FPE
(m,p)
FPE
(m,n,p)
ECM Causality
G→US
FPE
(m,p)
FPE
(m,n,p)
ECM Causality
US→G
Austria 0.0099
m=2
p=1
0.0089
n=1
0.2359
(1.3164)
YES 0.0157
m=1
p=1
0.0149
n=9
0.1377
(0.5983)
YES
Belgium 0.4749
m=12
p=12
0.3960
n=12
-0.0210
(-0.8942)
YES 0.0960
m=12
p=12
0.0859
n=10
-0.0296c
(-1.9368)
YES
Denmark 0.4828
m=12
p=3
0.4699
n=5
-0.0404
(-1.5850)
YES 0.0966
m=12
p=8
0.0877
n=10
-0.0343b
(-2.4637)
YES
Spain 0.0312
m=1
p=1
0.0297
n=1
--- YES 0.0298
m=4
p=2
0.0300
n=1
--- NO
France 0.4865
m=12
p=1
0.4837
n=5
--- YES 0.0938
m=12
p=10
0.0787
n=12
--- YES
Netherlands 0.4149
m=12
p=6
0.3237
n=10
-0.0136
(-1.0398)
YES 0.0979
m=12
p=10
0.0852
n=12
-0.0618c
(-1.9218)
YES
Ireland 0.4627
m=12
p=11
0.4488
n=12
-0.0108
(-0.4962)
YES 0.0990
m=12
p=1
0.0885
n=12
-0.0200c
(-1.8355)
YES
Italy 0.4740
m=12
p=1
0.4705
n=4
--- YES 0.0986
m=12
p=10
0.0888
n=10
--- YES
Portugal 0.0241
m=10
p=2
0.0242
n=1
--- NO 0.0292
m=1
p=2
0.0300
n=1
--- NO
UK 0.0287
m=1
p=2
0.0274
n=3
--- YES 0.0299
m=4
p=1
0.0303
n=1
--- NO
Notes:
(i) m, n and p denote the lags for the dependent variable, the additional regressor (Germany or the US),
and every country in the first column of the table, respectively, leading to the smallest FPE in each
case; the maximum number of lags tried has been 12. G and US denote Germany and the US,
respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the t-statistics of
the ECMs (in parentheses).
TABLE 5
TESTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
A) Causality between German, EMS, and US interest rates (bivariate models)
X→G G→X
Country 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 0.5252 0.4756 0.3123 1.1132 1.0152 0.8799
Denmark 1.3472 1.3029 0.5235 1.3876 1.7864c 0.2547
France 0.5022 0.4016 0.3828 1.5967 c 1.8587c 1.4990
Netherlands 0.4646 0.5268 0.2645 0.8114 0.7042 0.2745
Ireland 0.3362 0.2346 0.1506 1.5070 1.5177 0.2638
Italy 0.3457 0.3019 0.2628 0.9628 0.4445 1.2499
US 0.3505 0.3290 0.2949 0.9173 0.4890 0.4483
B) Causality between German and EMS interest rates (trivariate models)
X→G G→X
Country 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 0.5029 0.5729 0.3505 1.2957 1.2268 1.0542
Denmark 0.8851 0.8811 0.4032 1.1086 1.3526 0.4097
France 0.7199 0.6993 0.6706 1.4200c 1.9734a 1.1229
Netherlands 0.5464 0.5647 0.3102 0.5611 0.5602 0.2417
Ireland 0.3142 0.5294 0.2884 1.6267 1.8469c 0.4687
Italy 0.3982 0.2810 0.4058 1.0061 1.1471 0.4841
C) Causality between US and EMS interest rates (trivariate models)
X→US US→X
Country 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 0.8602 0.5491 0.4969 1.2361 1.1744 1.0092
Denmark 0.9676 0.5811 0.4331 1.1086 1.3526 0.4097
France 1.1509 0.7850 0.4990 1.5068 1.3741 0.7552
Netherlands 0.9628 0.4741 0.4667 0.5337 0.5841 0.2509
Ireland 0.6805 0.4278 0.2664 1.4710 1.7668b 0.3264
Italy 1.2955 0.5716 0.4139 1.0061 1.1471 0.4841
D) Causality between US and German interest rates (trivariate models)
G→US US→G
Country 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08 1990:11 1992:09 1993:08
Belgium 0.9875 0.5805 0.5685 0.5524 0.6168 0.3963
Denmark 0.9676 0.5811 0.4331 0.9626 0.9138 0.4228
France 0.8817 0.4799 0.4143 0.6514 0.6230 0.6146
Netherlands 0.7843 0.5370 0.5363 0.6044 0.6204 0.2831
Ireland 0.9433 0.5308 0.4029 0.3142 0.5294 0.2884
Italy 1.0824 0.4630 0.3363 0.4374 0.4408 0.2775
Notes:
(i) X , G, and US denote every country in the first column of the tables, Germany and the US, respectively.
(ii) (a), (b), and (c) denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
